How Bowlers Plan Against Specific Batsmen

The Planning Process: Before the Match

A modern international bowling plan begins weeks before the match. The team's analyst pulls together the target batsman's last 2–3 years of dismissal data, broken into format (Test, ODI, T20) and separated by pitch condition type (pace/bounce, spin, swing). The first question is: where does this batsman get out? The 'wagon wheel' of dismissals shows the geographic distribution — a batsman dismissed eight times in the slips zone by away-swinging deliveries is a very different target from one dismissed five times caught at mid-on attempting straight drives. Once the dismissal pattern is clear, the second question is: what does this batsman score freely against, and can we take it away?

The overlap between a batsman's scoring zone and their dismissal zone is the critical insight. Virat Kohli in 2014 scored heavily through the off side but was also dismissed repeatedly by deliveries angled across him outside off stump — because his trigger movement toward off stump was creating a gap between bat and pad. England identified this from video analysis and built a plan around consistently bowling the fourth-stump line, angling the ball away, avoiding the on-side where he dominated. In 14 innings, Kohli averaged 13.4. When he returned in 2018 with a modified trigger movement, he averaged 59.3 — the same plan no longer applied because the technical flaw had been corrected.

The Components of a Bowling Plan

A complete bowling plan for a specific batsman typically has four components: (1) the line — the primary target line (e.g., fourth stump, middle stump, leg stump); (2) the length — where to pitch the ball predominantly (good length, short of a good length, full); (3) the primary variation — the delivery used to create doubt after establishing the primary threat (e.g., the inswinger after repeated outswingers, the short ball after good-length deliveries); (4) the field — what fielding positions back up the plan's likely dismissal method. Plans that do not have a clear field component are incomplete — the field must make the plan coherent, otherwise a ball that generates the expected edge has no catcher.

The fourth-stump line against a right-hander requires a third slip or gully to catch an edge, a point for a cut shot that goes aerial, and typically no fine leg because there is nothing to hit fine leg with from that line. A plan targeting leg stump requires a mid-on, a mid-wicket, and potentially a short mid-wicket for the miscued leg-side pull — but probably no slips, because edges from leg stump angle to fine leg rather than slip.

Building Pressure: Sequencing the Plan

Good bowling plans are not executed as single deliveries — they are sequences designed to create escalating doubt. The standard sequence is: establish the primary threat with three to four deliveries that stay in the same area; then introduce the primary variation once the batsman has committed to the primary threat pattern; then return to the primary threat immediately after the variation to maximise uncertainty. Shane Warne's method exemplified this: he would bowl four consecutive leg-breaks spinning away from a right-hander, drawing the batsman forward and establishing the expectation of away turn; then bowl the googly, which spins the other way — the batsman's committed weight forward, expecting the away turn, and has no time to adjust.

Data Tools: Pitch Maps and Dismissal Charts

The primary data tools used are pitch maps (dot plots showing where each delivery was pitched, revealing line and length tendencies) and dismissal charts (wagon wheels showing where each dismissal occurred and the ball type). Modern analytics platforms — CricViz, Hawkeye's data outputs, ESPNcricinfo's CricInfo data — allow analysts to filter dismissal data by: ball age (new ball vs old ball), bowling arm (left vs right), over-the-wicket vs around-the-wicket, and by the home/away context. A batsman who averages 22 against left-arm bowling away from home is a very different target from the same batsman averaging 55 against right-arm at home.

CricViz's 'Expected Average' metric estimates what a batsman's average should be given the deliveries they faced, their historic dismissal patterns, and the pitch. If a batsman's observed average substantially exceeds their expected average, they have been bailed out — they are playing riskier than their dismissal rate suggests. If their observed average is substantially below expected, they have been unlucky or are being targeted with an unusually effective plan.

When to Deviate From the Plan

The most common mistake in bowling plans is persisting with them past the point of effectiveness. A plan works when it creates doubt — when the batsman's decision-making is unsettled and they play defensively outside their normal game. If the batsman is scoring freely from the planned line, the plan is not working and must change. A batsman who has started using their feet to a spinner has adjusted — the spinner should stop using flight and switch to flatter deliveries. A batsman who has learned to leave the fourth-stump ball consistently must be attacked from around the wicket to change the angle.

Glenn McGrath's policy was to bowl the same line regardless — he trusted that his extreme accuracy meant any batsman who decided to leave the fourth-stump ball would at some point make an error in judgment. That worked because of his precision; for a less accurate bowler, persistence on a line the batsman has stopped playing at is simply conceding dot balls without wicket threat. The counter-principle: if a plan has been executed correctly and accurately for 10–15 deliveries without either a wicket or visible doubt, it should be reviewed — not necessarily changed, but reviewed.

The Psychological Dimension

Bowling plans have a psychological component that goes beyond ball placement. Sledging, aggressive celebrations, and deliberate body language are all part of creating an environment where the batsman feels the plan is working even when it is not producing wickets. A batsman who feels surrounded by intent — fielders placed aggressively close, a bowler who celebrates near-misses — is under more psychological pressure than one who faces the same deliveries in an atmosphere of indifference. Ian Chappell's Australia sides in the 1970s deliberately created an atmosphere of sustained noise and aggression as a tactical element. The aim was to increase the arousal level of the batting side past the optimal zone for performance.